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Hopkins: The Winds of Change: New Styles in the Appellate Process

THE WINDS OF CHANGE: NEW STYLES IN THE
APPELLATE PROCESS
By The Honorable James D. Hopkins*
"We live in a world of change. If a body of law were in existence adequate for the civilization of today, it could not meet the
demands of the civilization of tomorrow." B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 10 (1928).

I
Form follows function; reform follows necessity. Thus, the
constant search for better ways of doing old tasks-the flux between systole and diastole-is rationalized. Though a litigant
does not have a constitutional right to an appellate review of a
decision adverse to him,1 the modern view-buttressed by statutes in both the federal and state systems-is that a litigait is
entitled to at least one appellate review.' A right, once recognized,
is characterized by a kind of Parkinson's law: it tends to expand
to the limit of its efficiency in the legal system. In the last two
decades the number of appeals has steadily increased year by
year until a point3 of saturation has nearly been reached in some
appellate courts.
The causes of the inundation are not difficult to discover:
1. The growth of population, particularly during a period of
4
economic development, produces more litigation.
2. The Supreme Court has granted the indigent free repre5
sentation by counsel in the review of criminal convictions.
3. The Supreme Court has created a series of decision
* Associate Justice, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York Supreme

Court; Chairman-Elect of the Executive Committee of the Appellate Judge's Conference
of the American Bar Association.
1. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163,
61 N.E.2d 427 (1945); People ex rel. Welch v. Bard, 209 N.Y.2d 304, 103 N.E.2d 140 (1913).
2. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). See generally Hopkins, Small Sparks from
a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate Process, 38 BKLYN. L. REv. 551, 552-56
(1972).
3. See THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW ExPLoSION (Jones ed. 1975); G. HAZARD,
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT-THE RENDITION OF APPELLATE REvIEw, 75-77 (1975).

4. There is probably a constant (not static) per thousand of population which applies
to appellate litigation. I have not seen it. Judge Hufstedler has suggested that the constant
varies as to the mix of population by age, density and location. Hufstedler, New Blocks
for Old Pyramids:Reshaping the JudicialSystem, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 901, 902-05 (1971).
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); People v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278, 140
N.E.2d 357, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1957).
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points6 in the field of criminal law which have resulted in a plethora of appeals stimulated by the chance of success.7
4. The review of administrative board decisions and state
and municipal legislative action's has been encouraged in areas
once considered immune from judicial oversight.8
5. An acceleration in the natural development of precedent
in the field of the common law seems to have occurred, thereby
fostering appeals on claims not ordinarily considered to be debatable or even feasible."
I should immediately add a caveat. I do not mean to imply
that the great increase in the number of appeals has carried with
it a corresponding increase in the number of successful appeals.
Nearly fifty years ago Cardozo wrote that probably 80 percent of
the appeals taken were foredoomed to failure." Current figures on
6. This descriptive phrase was coined by John P. Frank in his book, J. FRANK,
cAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFO

AMEIU-

(1969).

7. The examples are nearly endless. A sampling might be: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent's right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal
searches); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (federal habeas corpus over state prisoners);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (warnings prior to confession); Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964) (right of hearing on use of confession); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967) (right to counsel at line-up); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double
jeopardy); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (use of co-defendant's confession);
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty plea).
8. Two tendencies mark this cause for the increase in appeals: (1) the inclination to
enlarge the right of standing to complain, e.g., Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972); Douglaston Civic Ass'n
v. Galvin, N.Y.2d _, 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 7 (Dec. 20, 1974);
and (2) the inclination to take cognizance over areas once thought to be without the court's
competence, e.g., in the composition of student bodies (Brown v. Board of Educ., 374 U.S.
483 (1954)); in teachers' rights (Perry v. Sunderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)); in civil servants' rights (cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, U.S. -,
94 S.Ct. 1633 (1974)); in welfare
recipients' rights (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)); and in parolees' rights (Morris.
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
9. E.g., in New York the Court of Appeals has in the last twenty years made decisions
which have changed the path of the law: Randy Knitwear Co. v. American Cyanimid Co.,
11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 363, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (privity in breach of warranty);
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1953) (aesthetic
interests in zoning); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963)(conflicts of law); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 236, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (fright as a ground of action); Gorgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d
151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1963) (statute of limitations in malpractice actions); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969)
(abolition of parent-child immunity); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282
N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) (indemnity in tort actions based on proportionate
responsibility). Similar changes in precedent are mirrored in every jurisdiction during the
same period.
10. B. CARDozo, THE GRowTH OF TH LAW 80 (1924).
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the appellate process, though not approaching the prediction of
Cardozo, do not support the conclusion that an appeal is more
successful than not; the conclusion is to the contrary. 1 It is of
course the hope of a spectacular reversal which captures the imagination of counsel and spurs the loser at the trial level into
believing that the appellate court will somehow undo the result
and find ultimately in his favor. Thus, the volume of appeals
depends to a significant degree on the psychological pattern of the
12
litigation.
II
There is always an interest among judges in learning how
other judges respond to problems. Up until about twenty years
ago that interest was manifested by informal conversations between judges when they met. In 1956, however, the New York
University School of Law and the Institute of Judicial Administration at New York University began a seminar for appellate
judges in courts of last resort drawn from the United States and
Canada, dealing with, among other topics, methods of disposing
of appeals. Those seminars, under the leadership of Robert A.
Leflar, have continued yearly, and similar seminars have for the
past ten years been carried on for intermediate appellate court
judges as well. Out of these seminars has arisen a continuing
stimulus of discussion and thought about better appellate pro13
cesses.
In 1961 the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association issued a pamphlet, mainly through the authorship of Judge Frederick G. Hamley, of the United States
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, which described then current
11. The figures for the fiscal year 1973-74 for reversals and modifications by the
Appellate Division in New York show a 30 percent rate of success. TTw
wm ANN. REP.
OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, table 4.

12. There is, of course, a fraction of the appeals which are taken for tactical reasons
of delay or settlement negotiations. I do not refer to them in the sense of the text. By
psychological pattern I mean appeals which in the eye of the loser are prompted by a hope
for a reversal because of the ripeness for a change in the law or an emerging development
in the law. Cf. Rosenberg, Observation:Let's Everybody Litigate, 50 TFX. L. REV. 1349,
1350-52 (1972).
13. For a general overview of the seminars and the contribution of Professor Leflar
to them, see Burger, School for Judges, 35 F.R.D. 139 (1963); Klein, Robert A. Leflar-Institute of JudicialAdministrationStalwart, 25 ARx. L. REv. 112 (1971); Kenison,
The Continuing Contributionof Robert A. Leflar to the JudicialEducation of Appellate
Judges, 25 ARK. L. REv. 95 (1971).
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approaches in the appellate process. 4 In 1966 the Appellate
Judges Conference was founded as a part of the Section (now
Division) of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association. The membership of the Conference now comprises the
vast majority of both federal and state appellate judges. The
Conference, under the leadership of Justice Albert A. Tate of
Louisiana, Justice Harry A. Spencer of Nebraska, Justice William A. Grimes of New Hampshire, Judge T. John Lesinski of
Michigan, and Judge Floyd R. Gibson of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, has been sponsoring seminars for appellate judges in various regions of the United States
in which the appellate systems in use by innovative courts have
been discussed and debated.
Since 1971 the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice,
chaired by Professor Maurice Rosenberg of the Columbia School
of Law, has been meeting periodically and has issued several
monographs on aspects of the appellate process. 5 In January,
1975 the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice held the National
Conference on Appellate Justice at which over 200 inviteesjudges, lawyers, law professors, representatives of the press
and other communication media, and lay people-focused on the
problems which now face appellate courts and considered solutions to those problems.
The pressure of the flood of appeals surging into the appellate courts has thus induced serious concern over the continuing
ability of these courts to satisfy the rightful demand to dispense
a high quality of justice without at the same time falling into
undue delay. Several methods have been suggested as means to
reduce delay while maintaining the desired quality of justice.
I
Before treating these suggestions, it should be noted that
there have been other means, involving external controls, which
have been advanced. These controls may be exercised by statutory and/or constitutional provisions which determine the extent
14. The pamphlet is the subject of revision by the American Bar Foundation in
collaboration with an Advisory Committee sponsored by the Appellate Judges Conference
of the American Bar Association.
15. E.g., Feinberg, Expediting Review of Felony Convictions, 59 A.B.A.J. 1026
(1973); STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS (ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE
JUsTIcE, FJC Research Series No. 73-2, STATE COURTS WORK-IN-PRoonESS SEaIES, Publication No. NCSC Wood 4) (1973).
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and content of the jurisdiction over the subject matter;' 6 the geo-

graphical divisions of the court system;' 7 the total membership of
the courts,' and panel number.' 9 Because they require legislative

action, these exterior controls lie beyond the will of the appellate
court. What I speak of here as appellate process relates to the

internal operating procedure of the court to dispose of its business. These latter procedures are largely within the competence
of the court to shape.20
Judging is an intensely personal act. Throughout the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth century,

judges at the appellate level listened to arguments, read the
briefs, consulted with one another, decided the appeal, and wrote

the opinion, pretty much in that order. Two salient characteristics are discernible. First, the judge in the usual case became
familiar with the facts and issues only when they were presented
to him on the argument of the appeal. Second, the assistance of
law clerks was minimal. 2' These are characteristics related to an

era when the pace of litigation and life was slower. The image was
of a judge isolated from even thinking about a case until it ap-

peared on the day's calendar, after having progressed through the
16. Restricting the right to appeal does not appear to be welcome. We are inured to
the concept of an appeal from the initial decision; and the lack of an appeal instills the
preeminence of the trial or nisi prius court. The trend, indeed, is toward greater, not lesser,
review. See Hopkins, Small Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
Process, 38 BKLYN. L. REv. 551, 552-57 (1972); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Court
of Appeals: The Threat to the Functionof Review and the NationalLaw, 82 HI-Rv. L. Rv.
542, 567-68 (1969).
17. However, changing boundaries is beset with thorny problems. See, REPORT, ComMISSION OF THE FEDERA
COURT APPELIATE SYSTm, Dec. 18, 1973, 3-5, indicating that
changes in the limits of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits were merely palliatives, rather than
a direct solution.
18. This device can create more problems than it solves, as California discovered. See
Christian, Using PrehearingProcedures to Increase Productivity, 52 F.R.D. 55, 57-60
(1971).
19. Nine judges are about the greatest number which can operate comfortably as a
panel; en banc hearings in the federal courts have emphasized the difficulties above this
number. See, REPORT, COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL CoURT APPELLATE SYsTEm,
Dec. 18, 1954, 1-2, 6-7 (1973). See also Note, En Banc Review in FederalCircuit Courts:
A Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. R-v. 1637 (1974); Comment, En Banc Procedures in the
L. REv. 401 (1974).
United States Court of Appeals, 43 FORDHAm
20. This statement needs qualification. In certain states the appellate court is directed to write an opinion or memorandum in every case. E.g., CAL. CONsT, art. VI, § 14.
In New York, the appellate court must write whenever it reverses. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5522
(McKinney 1963).
21. For a historical perspective of the use of law clerks, see Baler, The Law Clerks:
Profile of an Institution, 26 VAD. L. REV. 1125, 1129-36 (1973).
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procedures of filing, the preparation of the record, and the preparation and exchange of briefs by counsel. These preliminary
steps, it will be noted, are the work of the lawyers; the role of the
court in the process is entirely passive.
When the business of appellate courts increased, the aid of
law clerks was the first change in the process. But the law clerk
traditionally did not enter the pTocess, any more than had the
judge, until after the argument of the appeal. The judge called
on the law clerk to help him in research and the composition of
an opinion. As the case load mounted, the initial response in most
appellate courts was to assign more law clerks to assist the judge.
There is, however, a practical limitation to the efficiency of the
process by simply adding law clerks. 2
As the volume of appeals grew even larger, more deliberate
reflection on the process produced the first truly innovative
change in the customary process. The order of consideration of
the briefs and the facts and issues in the case were reversed, so
that the judges became familiar with them prior to argument.
The argument of counsel could thus be directed toward the points
which it believed to be critical, thereby enabling the court to
reach a faster disposition of the appeal. 3 Under this method, the
members of the court are usually furnished with a memorandum
from a law clerk outlining the facts and issues presented and
providing a consideration of the relevant statutes and cases; this
may be brief or comprehensive, depending on the instructions
from the court.
This variant in the process has gained the title of the "hot
court" in contrast to the "cold court" of the traditional method.
I have had the opportunity to obtain first hand knowledge of both
methods. When I joined the Appellate Division, Second Department, of the New York Supreme Court in 1962, the court was
using the traditional method. I found myself at a serious disadvantage in attempting to follow the argument of counselespecially in framing questions designed to reach the core of the
case. Moreover, much time was consumed by counsel in relating
the facts, or in disputing the factual narrative of his adversary.
I also found that it was most difficult to keep a clear memory of
22. See

REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT,

7 (1972); A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT:
DoMEsIc AFFAIRS STUDY 21, at 9 (1973).
23. The process as it then existed in the Appellate Division, Second Department, of'
the Supreme Court has been described by me in 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 306 (1971).
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
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the argument during the three or four weeks prior to receiving
the report of the judge assigned to the case.
In 1970 the court changed to a system of pre-argument reports. Arguments of counsel are now shortened because of the
judges' familiarity with the facts, and are sharpened by questions
from the bench reflecting particular interest and doubts. But the
greatest advantage lies in the ability of the panel to confer on the
cases heard immediately after the conclusion of the arguments of
the cases on the calendar. Many of the cases heard or submitted,
perhaps as many as 80 percent, can be disposed of at this initial
conference. Thus, the delay between argument and disposition is
reduced considerably in the majority of cases. Those cases which
require further study are placed on a consultation calendar for
discussion and vote a week or so beyond the argument.
It is true that the "hot court" method is not altogether without deficiencies. In a court such as the Second Department, where
the day calendar lists at least 25 appeals, the method thrusts a
heavy burden on the staff to supply in advance (usually a week)
a report of each appeal to the judges on the panel.2 4 In addition,
the method necessitates a constant reading and examination of
briefs and reports in the cases to be considered by the judges
sitting on a particular day. The load is multiplied by the number
of days the judge is sitting each term.2 5 Make no mistake about
it: both staff and the members of the court must be prepared to
devote continuous and intensive work, not only during the daily
schedule but also outside the workday-at nights and weekends-to keep abreast of the demands which the "hot court"
method exacts. Despite this deficiency, which on occasion may be
a serious one, I believe that its advantages in getting to the substance of a case quickly and in reducing delay outweigh the objections to it.
Obviously, this method must be supported by a highly comptent staff sufficient in number to meet the time demands.2 6 The
advantages of the method are lost if the report does not reach the
judges before argument in enough time for the judge to give the
24. The burden is augmented during a monthly term in which 300 or more appeals
are scheduled to be heard. This is not an unusual number in the Second Department.
25. The custom in the Second Department is to schedule 25 appeals per sitting.
Hence, a judge may sit five or more times during a term.
26. The method requires the filing of appellants' and respondents' briefs in such
advance time that a report can be prepared and circulated at least five days before the
actual argument of the case.
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appropriate consideration to the briefs and the report. The Second Department has adopted the system of a staff pool; that is,
a law assistant is not assigned to the total work load of any one
judge, but rather is assigned to particular appeals which may be
the responsibility of any of the judges on the court. I do not think
this system ideal, for it does not allow for a close relationship
between judge and law assistant which is valuable to both of
them. In a court faced with an enormous work load, however, the
system is almost inevitable, since it permits a flexibility not present otherwise."
IV
An adaptation of the "hot court" method involves the screening of appeals, a more recent invention. Screening is a broad
term, used generally to describe a variety of practices. In the
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, and in the Michigan Court of Appeals, for example, each appeal is examined preliminarily in order to determine whether (a) it is frivolous and
thus subject to dismissal or affirmance without opinion; (b) oral
argument may not be required and it is thus subject to decision
by a panel on the briefs and record; (c) the time of argument can
be properly limited; and (d) the issues to be argued can be properly limited.2 In the Fifth Circuit, this screening practice is
administered by a panel of three judges assisted by staff; in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, screening is accomplished by a staff
of experienced law assistants who make recommendations for disposition of the appeal, together with a proposed per curiam deci29
sion which may be adopted by the panel.
Screening is also used in another sense. In the United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, a practice has been recently
initiated in civil appeals to determine whether the case is susceptible of settlement. At the time of the filing of the notice of appeal, or shortly thereafter, the appellant is required to file with
27. It is a tribute to the law assistants in the Second Department that despite the
grinding rigors of the "hot court" method the docket of the court has not fallen behind. It
is still the fact that an appeal noticed for any term of the court will be heard during that
term.
28. For full description of the process in the Fifth Circuit, see Murphy v. Houma Well
Serv., 409 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1969); Huth v. Southern Pacific Co., 417 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.
1969). The Third Circuit has somewhat similar practices. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD Cmcurr (Mar. 1, 1974).
29. Christian, Using PrehearingProcedures to Increase Productivity, 52 F.R.D. 55
(1971).
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the court a form describing briefly the nature of the case, the
issues on appeal, and whether a transcript, if necessary, has been
ordered from the court reporter. A commissioner appointed by the
court then reviews the statements to determine whether further
action will result in a probable settlement. If the commissioner
so concludes, the attorneys are notified30 to appear before the commissioner for a discussion of the case.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, has recently
followed this procedure with some variation. 3 Instead of a commissioner appointed by the court, a member of the court supervises the screening and discusses the case with the attorneys.
Moreover, in addition to exploring the settlement possibilities,
the judge attempts to limit issues upon agreement by the parties,
if the opportunity for settlement is not present. In some cases, the
judge will recommend to the panel scheduled to hear the appeal
that a short report by staff is all that is necessary for disposition.
Thus a full report furnishing all of the facts, the contentions of
the parties, and a thorough research of the law may be avoided.
Of course, the judge presiding over the screening process does not
sit as a member of the panel hearing the appeal.
Screening, whatever its variation, is a practice stemming
from the need to cut through a heavy case load in a busy court.
It has not escaped criticism. It is said that the system does not
truly result in the economy of time or effort, since the time and
effort consumed in screening would achieve in most cases a disposition of the appeal under the ordinary process.32 This criticism
may be valid where the panel of judges itself administers the
system; it does not have the same force where the screening is
30. See, FED. R. App. P. 33. Chief Judge Kaufman has written on the use and efficacy
of the pre-argument settlement procedure. Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An
Appellate ProceduralReform, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 1094 (1974).
31. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 670.28, eff. Dec. 1, 1974. In discussions with Justice A.
David Benjamin of the Appellate Division, Second Department, who has presided over
the settlement program since its inception on December 1, 1974, I have learned that over
192 cases have been processed under the program. Over 47 percent have been settled and
the appeals withdrawn. Beyond this result, in one-third the cases, the issues were defined
by the attorneys, and the appeal assigned for a prompt report. See 173 N.Y.L.J. 48, Mar.
12, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
Apparently, the same procedure is being tried by the Court of Appeal, Third District,
in California, on an experimental basis. REPORT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS
(1975).
32. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 571-72 (1939).
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accomplished by staff or by a single judge making recommendations to the panel.
Another criticism is that, at least insofar as screening is
adopted by a court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court of
the United States, public confidence in the appellate process
might be impaired if the judges merely accepted recommendations from staff.33 This criticism implies an abdication of responsibility by the court-an unwarranted assumption. Although a
recommendation for the disposition of cases comes from the staff,
it by no means follows that all the members of the court will
accept the recommendation without consideration of the merits.
V
One technique to reduce congestion, originally advanced by
Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler of the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, has been varied in detail but not in substantive features since its inception, and has yet to be tried in the
United States courts. Judge Hufstedler in her initial proposal
first distinguished between two functions of an appellate court:
the review for correctness, that is, whether any prejudicial error
was found in the record; and the institutional review, that is,
whether an authoritative statement of the law ought to be made
or a change in precedent or doctrine announced. The latter function, she argued, should be discharged by the traditional method
of appellate review. The first function, however, she considered
could be better performed through a swift, inexpensive and adequate process in an intermediate appellate court which would
combine the review for error with all post-trial motions made
before the trial court. The aggrieved party would move for review,
and within 30 days, a three judge panel would hear the case, not
on a transcript of the trial, but on briefs. The three judge court
would be made up of the trial judge and two appellate judges, and
would be empowered to make any disposition of the case that an
appellate court could make. Appeals from this disposition could
be taken to the intermediate appellate court by permission only. 4
Professor Daniel J. Meador has noted that the English Court
of Appeal combines the motion for a new trial with appellate
33. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 10.
34. Hufstedler, supra note 4, at 110-15. Judge Hufstedler has later amended the
proposal by eliminating the trial judge from the three judge reviewing court, so that all
three judges would be judges from the intermediate appellate court.
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review. New evidence and information outside the record, if properly authenticated, can be received by the Court of Appeal. The
emphasis in the court is placed on final disposition. There is no
right, for example, to a collateral attack in the nature of a coram
nobis application. Professor Meador has suggested, somewhat
along the lines of the Hufstedler proposal, that American courts
could draw on the English model to permit a combination of a
hearing of the motion for a new trial and the argument of the
appeal. 15
A somewhat related suggestion has been offered by Paul H.
Robinson calling for a post-judgment hearing before the trial
court shortly after trial. The court would be authorized to hear
any claim of the defendant, whether arising from the prior proceedings in court or stemming from matters outside the record.
Claims which are not raised at the hearing cannot later be pre3
sented except by certain narrow exceptions. 1
In this context, I should also refer to the unified review proceeding which has been endorsed by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. This proceeding, largely the creation of Professor Meador, differs from the
Robinson proposal, which it antedates, in that it would take place
31
in the appellate court, rather than in the trial court.
Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of the United States
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, has looked at the problem of a
unitary review in criminal cases from the standpoint of lessening
the burden thrust on the federal court system by post-conviction
remedies sought by state prisoners. He has proposed the establishment of a national court in the federal system consisting of
nine members, which would review on writs of certiorari federal
issues in convictions in both the federal and state systems, as well
3
as all post convictions proceedings in both systems. 1
These suggestions for bold innovations deserve careful study.
Some of them relating to the disposition of criminal appeals are
35. D.

MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS: ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN REFORMS,

71-87

(1973).
36. Robinson, Proposal and Analysis of a Unitary System for Review of Criminal
Judgments, 54 B.U.L. REV. 485 (1974).
37. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND

GOALS-REPORT ON COURTS, Standards 6.1 - 6.8 (1973).
38. Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administrationof Justice, 59 A.B.A.J.
841 (1973); see also Haynsworth, Improving the Handlingof CriminalCases in the Federal
Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1974).
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not susceptible of experimentation without the consent of the
defendant; and counsel for the defendant might well be doubtful
whether he should advise the defendant to consent to a new procedure lest the defendant later claim that he did not receive
proper representation. But those proposals which equally apply
to civil appeals could well be tried by stipulation of the parties.
The question which must be answered is whether a new procedure
will expedite the appeal, reduce its expense, and result in a fair
disposition. That answer could be found in an experiment under
controlled conditions with selected cases.
VI
Two other developments must be observed, although they lie
outside the strict confines of this paper. There is first, the enormous interest which has been generated in the creation of a national court of appeals to help the Supreme Court. The rate of
litigation in the federal courts has surged to proportions which
have caused delays in the circuit courts of appeals and increased
vastly the number of certiorari applications and appeals to the
Supreme Court. The sheer intellectual labor borne by the members of the Court, the growth of unresolved issues and conflicts
among the circuits, and the limited percentage of cases which can
be reviewed by the Court are factors which have led to mounting
speculation concerning the creation of a court which would be
empowered to decide cases of importance not within the present
capacity of the Supreme Court to review. First proposed by the
Freund Commission, 39 the idea has provoked all sorts of responses, approvals, disapprovals and amendments." A recent announcement of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, whose members are appointees of the President, the Congress and the Chief Justice, reveals that it has approved a national court having jurisdiction to decide inter-circuit
conflicts and to receive cases from the Supreme Court.4
39.

REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT,

supra note

22.

40. I can do no more than refer to a few, since the literature is so extensive, e.g.,
Alsup, A Policy Assessment of the National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 1313
(1974); Blumstein, The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-ReformProposals,Discretionary
Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REv. 895 (1973); Freund, A National Court of
Appeals, 25 HASTNGS L.J. 1301 (1974); Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A
Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. (1973); Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 50
A.B.A.J. 361 (1973); Rosenberg, PlannedFlexibility to Meet ChangingNeeds of the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. Rzv. 576 (1974).
41. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 7 (city ed.).
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All of the proposals vary in design, but all agree a change in
the federal appellate structure is in order. It is impossible within
reasonable limits to describe the differences which the several
plans present, or even to sketch the objections which the opponents offer to all the plans. The battleground rests mainly on the
issues whether in fact the Supreme Court is overburdened, and
whether its prestige and acceptance within our government would
be markedly and detrimentally affected by a new court. None of
this, of course, relates to style in appellate procedure, and I therefore allude to the suggestions peripherally.
The second development lies in the stress on the continuing
education of appellate judges of which I spoke earlier.4 2 In addition to the seminars sponsored by the Institute of Judicial Administration and the Appellate Judges Conference, a few states have
established annual meetings for appellate judges, at which problems are discussed and speakers on appellate problems invited to
discuss them.13 It will come to pass in my estimation that in the
future appellate judges will be expected, perhaps even required,
to attend such seminars periodically in order that current developments in the law and appellate procedure may be brought
home to them.
VII
There is no likelihood that appellate litigation will decrease.
The balance must be fairly struck between the need for efficiency
and the need to render justice in the process. Doubtless a gnawing
anxiety will always exist as to whether the drive for efficiency has
submerged the goal to render justice. In the end the conscience
of the judge must be the final test-in this question, as it is in
all questions.
Process, however well planned and intentioned, breaks down
under inept or careless administration. Our ultimate objective as
appellate judges must be to perform the process as it was conceived to function and to prevent the loss of individual justice.
42. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
43. E.g., Michigan, Louisiana, California.
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